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THE ABSENCE OF PENOLOGICAL RATIONALE IN THE
RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHTS OF INCARCERATED WOMEN
Thomas M Blumenthal and Kelly M Brunie*
As the controversy surrounding the freedom of choice persists in
American society, a small but important population of women has been
marginalized in the debate: female prisoners seeking to exercise their right
to choose while in custody. Nowhere is the freedom of choice more re-
stricted than in an institution that is created to deprive an individual of basic
freedoms, and yet nowhere is it more important to both the individual and to
the societal goals which incarceration seeks to address. Women in prison
are more likely to be in a situation where they conclude that abortion would
be in their best interest, yet in many instances they are unable to exercise
their right to choose while incarcerated. Prisons and jails may explicitly or
through unduly burdensome policies deny access to a medical procedure
that the Supreme Court has held to be a fundamental right. Judicial review
of such policies may often prove to be fruitless, as they are not always pro-
vided in a timely manner and often apply inconsistent analyses to the
claims. Many cases have been reviewed under the Turner rationality test,
used for analyzing prison regulations in general, rather than the Casey un-
due burden test, used for analyzing anti-choice laws. Even applying the
Turner test, the analysis applied is difficult to reconcile with actual fact.
Further exasperating the problem, patriarchic bias enhances the difficulty in
convincing the courts to classify a prison policy that denies or severely
hinders access to abortion as cruel and unusual punishment.
The prison systems in the United States have developed around the
needs of the traditionally male prison population. As more women enter the
system, prison policies have generally not kept pace with the specific needs
of female inmates. Many states have no official policy regarding abortion,
* Thomas M. Blumenthal is a practicing lawyer in St. Louis, Missouri at the law firm
of Paule, Camazine & Blumenthal, P.C.; an adjunct professor at Washington University
School of Law; and was the lead attorney and co-operating ACLU of Eastern Missouri At-
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productive Health Services. Kelly M. Brunie is a graduating student at Washington Universi-
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leaving the woman's freedom of choice in the hands of prison administra-
tors and officials who bow to the whims of the then current political admin-
istration. This runs the risk of allowing these politicos to impose their own
views and biases onto policy decisions that have major implications for the
women affected by them. Leaving such an important yet controversial right
to the whims of a few individuals, often male, is an untenable solution.
Even where states have implemented statewide policies regarding access to
abortion, women prisoners sometimes have fared no better. The state may
require the woman to seek a court order to receive abortion care, or it may
require her to obtain a court-ordered release before being transported to a
medical facility for the procedure. It may also impose waiting periods or
require psychiatric consultation before allowing the abortion procedure to
take place. The rationale behind such policies is that abortion is an "elec-
tive" procedure and therefore the inmate has no inherent right to it.
This approach is both medically and practically unsound. Abortion is
an "elective" procedure only to those who have never had to face the always
difficult choice of whether to have such a procedure. The choice is compli-
cated by religious mores, health considerations, peer pressure, economic
burdens, legal restrictions, and personal history. When added to the reality
that an incarcerated woman is not likely to be able to keep her child if she
carries to term, the decision of whether to terminate a pregnancy or carry to
term is hardly in the elective category of whether to correct a deviated sep-
tum or operate on a troubled rotator cuff.
As of 2005, nearly sixty-five percent of women in state prisons were
convicted of drug, property, or public order offenses.' One in three reported
committing their offense to support a drug addiction.2 Seventy-three percent
of women in prison either have symptoms of or have been diagnosed with a
mental illness.3 Nearly thirty percent of women entering prison received
public assistance prior to their arrest and thirty-seven percent have incomes
of less than $600 per month. 4 Sixty-four percent of women in prison do not
have a high school diploma.5 More than half of all women in prison report
having been physically or sexually abused at some point in their lives.6
Shockingly, the patriarchic governments still blame the women for the cir-
cumstance of pregnancy.
1. CORR. Ass'N. OF N.Y., WOMEN IN PRISON FACT SHEET (April 2009) available at
http://www.correctionalassociation.org/publications/download/wipp/factsheetsfWomen-inP





6. Women's Prison Association, http://www.wpaonline.org/index.html.
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In 2005 in Missouri, the Department of Corrections went one step fur-
ther and changed a long-standing policy to now prohibit the transportation
of pregnant inmates to off-site facilities to receive elective abortion-related
medical care,7 thus forcing inmates to continue their pregnancies against
their will, with no possibility of relief through prison or court procedures.
Every abortion is considered "elective" unless the prison medical staff de-
termines the pregnancy is a threat to the mother's life or health. This deter-
mination must be approved by both the Medical Director and Regional
8Medical Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections. In Roe v.
Crawford, a pregnant inmate who was denied access to an abortion chal-
lenged this procedure on behalf of a class of all women similarly situated as
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.9 In
the midst of a circuit split on the issue and with no clear Supreme Court
guidance, the Eighth Circuit found that Missouri's policy failed under the
Turner rationality test, holding that despite the prison having a legitimate
security interest, the policy was not rationally related to this interest.10 The
court, however, rejected the contention that denying access to abortion care
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment."
This article explores the results of the litigation in Roe v. Crawford and
its implications for the continuing struggle to recognize the uncompromised
right of women to choose in the prison environment. Part I will provide
context for the case by analyzing the history of prisoners' rights, the history
of the freedom to choose, and the history of the freedom of choice in prison.
Part II will provide the background and the Eighth Circuit's analysis of Roe
v. Crawford. Part III will argue that the Eighth Circuit should have used the
Casey undue burden standard rather than the Turner rationality test when
analyzing prison policies regarding abortion. Furthermore, it will dispute the
court's determination that under the Turner rationality test the prison had a
legitimate security interest in its abortion policy. Despite the Plaintiff Class
prevailing on the overall Turner argument, such a negative finding on the
legitimate security interest issue has serious implications for future chal-
lenges to prison policies and was simply not supported by any fact pre-
sented by the Defendant State's prison system. Finally, Part IV will assert
that the prison's policy in Roe v. Crawford should have also failed under the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment be-
cause unwanted pregnancies pose a serious medical threat, both physically
and psychologically. Alternatively, it will suggest that viewing the freedom
7. Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 792 (8th Cir. 2008).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 793.




of choice as a medical issue is incorrect, and instead analysis should be
framed in terms of basic human dignity, deprivation of which always re-
quires a heightened standard of review when dealing with a fundamental
right.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Evolution of Prisoners' Rights
Incarceration by definition requires the forfeiture of some rights and
privileges that are normally bestowed upon American citizens. This then
provokes the question of what rights, if any, prisoners maintain in spite of
their incarceration. Until the 1970s, very little judicial attention was paid to
the issue of the rights of those incarcerated. It was presumed that upon im-
prisonment, the prisoner lost many or all rights and privileges once en-
joyed.' 2 Early cases went as far as to classify the prisoner as "civiliter mor-
tuus," or "civilly dead."' 3 During the later twentieth century the Supreme
Court began to relax its views towards prisoners, declaring, "[t]here is no
iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this coun-
try."' 14 These constitutional rights, however, were balanced against a need to
defer to the expertise and decisions of prison administrators.
Not until the early 1970s, partially as a result of the deplorable condi-
tions existing at many prisons nationwide, did the Supreme Court make its
first attempts to acknowledge limited rights of due process, equal protec-
tion, and other constitutional guarantees in the prison context. The Court
looked at a variety of claims in the following decades, including issues per-
taining to the right of access to the courts under the Due Process Clause;
questions about speech and religion under the First Amendment; privacy
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; and issues involving medical care,
punishment and discipline, and living conditions under the Eighth Amend-
ment.15 Although these cases made progress in expanding the rights of pris-
oners, they failed to establish a consistent standard to determine when a
prison restriction amounted to a constitutional violation. Additionally, the
12. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) ("Lawful incarceration brings about the
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights .... "), overruled on other
grounds by McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
13. Ruffm v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, *4 (1871).
14. Wolffv. McDonnnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
15. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (holding that prisoners have a right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures of property); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974) (requiring the application of certain due process protections to prison disciplinary
procedures); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (restricting censorship of prisoner
mail), overruled by Thomburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319
(1972) (upholding a prisoner's right to practice the religion of his choice).
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Court continued to defer to prison administrators when balancing the consti-
tutional interests of prisoners.
1 6
In 1987, after years of ad hoc balancing tests and reliance on a fluctuat-
ing list of factors and circumstances, the Supreme Court formulated a gen-
eral standard for measuring prisoners' claims of deprivation of constitution-
al rights. Turner v. Safley17 held that "when a prison regulation impinges on
inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably re-
lated to legitimate penological interests."' 8 This test, which merely requires
a rational basis to support a prison regulation, has effectively limited the
circumstances under which courts will recognize constitutional violations in
the prison setting.
Since Turner, this standard for reviewing prisoners' claims has been
generally applied; however, the Court has recognized that it is not appropri-
ate for every type of constitutional claim. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
19
the Court attempted to apply Turner to decide a case involving religious
freedom in prison but eventually rejected the test in favor of a "compelling
government interest" standard under the Establishment Clause.2 ° Some
Eighth Amendment claims have also proved incompatible with Turner and
are instead judged using the "standards of decency" test which considers
whether the punishment is so disproportionate that it "shocks the con-
science' '2' or is "repugnant to the conscience of mankind., 22 Similarly,
when racial segregation is involved the Court has found that equal protec-
tion requires the usual strict scrutiny test rather than the more deferential
Turner rationality test.
23
One reason that these cases eschew the Turner analysis in these consti-
tutional balancing analyses is that legitimate penological interests do not
rationally support restrictions on most fundamental constitutional rights.
Valid penological interests have been found to include "deterrence of crime,
rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security. ' '24 Neither deterrence
nor rehabilitation can be said to be furthered by forcing a woman to carry to
term. Institutional security is rationally implicated in this analysis, but only
marginally so. Denying an incarcerated woman access to terminating her
16. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817 (1974).
17. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
18. Id. at 89.
19. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
20. Id.
21. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
22. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
23. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
24. OLone, 482 U.S. at 348.
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pregnancy on grounds unique to incarceration will be shown to lack a ra-
tional legitimate interest of the state.
B. Evolution of the Freedom to Choose
Similar to the history of prisoners' rights, the right of a woman to
choose to terminate her pregnancy made great strides in the second half of
the twentieth century, only to be incrementally eroded in the following dec-
ades by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In 1965, the Court set the
stage for future decisions by striking down a law that prohibited the distri-
bution of contraceptives to married couples,25 followed by the 1972 decision
on the same issue as applied to unmarried couples, and holding that the "de-
cision whether to bear or beget a child" was a fundamental right protected
by the Due Process Clause.26 A year later, the Court applied this reasoning
to the right to choose in the seminal case of Roe v. Wade, 27 recognizing that
the right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy., 28 By classifying the right to
choose as a fundamental right, the Court required that laws interfering with
this right must be necessary to support a compelling state interest.29 The
Court determined that the state has two compelling interests in a woman's
pregnancy: protecting the health of the mother and protecting the potential
life of the fetus. 30 In determining at what point these interests become com-
pelling, the Court broke down the pregnancy into trimesters and held that
the state's interest in the mother's health only becomes compelling at the
end of the first trimester.31 Before this time, her right to choose cannot be
restricted at all; the state has no compelling interest because the risks of
carrying the child to term are greater than the risks of terminating the preg-
nancy.32 Once the end of the first trimester is reached, the state may regulate
the right to choose only in ways that legitimately protect the health of the
mother by ensuring that procedures are safe.33 Not until the end of the
second trimester does the state obtain an interest in the potential life of the
fetus.34 After this point, the state may regulate or even prohibit abortions
that are not medically necessary.
25. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
28. Id. at 153.
29. Id. at 153-55.
30. Id. at 162-63.
31. Id. at 163.
32. Id.
33. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
34. Id.
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While the trimester approach was a compromise cobbled from medical
science rather than constitutional precepts, it held some logic which ap-
pealed to all points of view while pleasing none of them. At the same time,
it provided the chink in the armor of Roe's foundation that allowed later
courts to slowly reduce the right from its fundamental underpinnings. Had
the Court simply acknowledged the fundamental nature of the right as em-
bedded in the privacy jurisprudence it had established and left the decision
as a personal medical issue between a woman and her doctor, the constant
attacks on the right to choose would have been harder for the conservative
judicial activists on the Court to make. Indeed, in no other area of medicine
does the Court attempt to practice medicine with such exactitude and allow
the legislature to tell doctors how to do their job.
Consequently, in the aftermath of Roe, states enacted various laws that
restricted women's access to abortion by playing on Roe's trimester frame-
work. The Court has upheld some administrative restrictions, including re-
quirements for written consent, waiting periods, and record-keeping. 35 Re-
strictions that interfered more substantially with the first and second trimes-
ters of pregnancy were often struck down.36 Statutes that restricted access to
abortion clinics or that endangered the health of the mother to protect the
fetus did not survive Roe's strict scrutiny test.37 These decisions did not,
however, come easily to the Court. In many cases the Court was sharply
split on how to apply Roe's test to statutory restrictions on abortions. The
majority of the Court finally settled on a broader "undue burden" test, intro-
duced for the first time by Justice O'Connor in City of Akron v. Akron Cen-
ter for Reproductive Health, Inc.,38 which only looked at whether a restric-
tion encroached on the fundamental liberty interest at stake.39 The majority
found that if the statute imposed an undue burden, such as delaying, limit-
ing, or increasing the cost of abortion, strict scrutiny would apply and in
most instances defeat the statute.40 The minority preferred to employ a high-
er threshold of encroachment and argued that any regulation that was not an
35. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding a state statute requiring
parental consent for minors); see also Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)
(upholding a state statute that imposed restrictions on the use of state funds for performing or
assisting abortion procedures).
36. See, e.g., City of Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), over-
ruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
37. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking
down a state statute requiring spousal consent); see also City of Akron, 462 U.S. 416 (invali-
dating waiting periods and requirements that the procedure be performed in a hospital).
38. 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).




absolute barrier to an abortion should be analyzed under a rational basis
standard.
41
This disagreement within the Court came to a head in 1992, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.42 Casey involved a challenge to a Pennsylvania law
that required married women to notify their husbands before having an
abortion, required doctors to give specific information about the fetus to a
woman seeking an abortion, prescribed a twenty-four-hour waiting period
before receiving an abortion, enacted a parental consent requirement for
minors, and included various other record-keeping requirements. 43 Pre-
viously, the Court had struck down similar provisions as unconstitutional
under the Roe strict scrutiny test.44 In Casey, however, the Court effectively
abandoned Roe's trimester framework in favor of a more generalized "un-
due burden" test.45 Under the undue burden test, the legislature may not
place a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus."4 Under this test the Court no longer adjusted the balanc-
ing test between the state's interests and individual rights according to the
stage of pregnancy. Because the Court now believed that the state had a
substantial interest in the potential life of the fetus throughout the pregnan-
cy, the new test simply focused on "substantial obstacle[s]" at any point
during the pregnancy.47 As such, the Court upheld all the provisions of the
challenged statute except for the requirement that a married woman notify
her husband before having an abortion, reasoning that in cases of domestic
violence a requirement to inform an abusive husband may effectively pre-
vent the woman from receiving the procedure.48
The new test made it easier for states to regulate abortion. The Court
now only considers burdens to be unconstitutional when the burdens are
absolute obstacles that are intended to prohibit the freedom of choice; laws
enacted to persuade or cajole a woman to choose childbirth over abortion
are no longer prohibited. Under Casey, the Court went on to overrule pre-
vious decisions that had found laws making an abortion more expensive or
time-consuming unconstitutional.49
41. Id. at 464 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1989).
42. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
43. Id. at 844.
44. See, e.g., City of Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), over-
ruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
45. Id. at 873.
46. Id. at 877.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 894.
49. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003).
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Once again, this was a position of compromise, much like the trimester
approach. Unwilling to grant the right to choose the highest scrutiny of oth-
er fundamental rights, and needing to pacify jurists who were wavering to-
ward overruling Roe but who were unable to justify violating stare decisis,
the Court's application of the undue burden approach gave everyone some-
thing that they desired without forcing anyone to form a definitive position
one way or the other. While less demonized than the trimester approach, the
undue burden test is not any more satisfactory, nor is it defensible from a
constitutional point of view. It is, nevertheless, the current state of the law.
C. Freedom to Choose in the Prison Environment
Today there are over 200,000 female inmates being held at state and
federal prisons and local jails around the country.5° The number of women
entering prison has increased every year at a rate almost twice as fast as the
rate of men entering prison.51 The majority of women inmates are single
mothers, minorities, come from economically disadvantaged populations,
and are often incarcerated for nonviolent drug offenses.5 2 In any given year,
between six and ten percent of the women who enter prison are pregnant,53
and still others become pregnant while incarcerated through consensual or
non-consensual relationships with male guards.54 Despite a growing prob-
lem with pregnancy in prisons and jails, no universal policy exists that al-
lows these women to terminate their pregnancies if they choose to do so.
55
Instead, policy details and procedures are generally delegated to officials
56running the prisons and jails.
Some states have official policies that allow for unrestricted access to
abortion, at least during the first trimester.57 Others qualify abortion as
50. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PUB. No. NCJ 225619, JAIL
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008-STATISTICAL TABLES (March 2009), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=839 (listing the number of women in jail
in 2008 at 99,175 and the number of women in prison in 2008 at 115,779).
51. Id.
52. WOMEN IN PRISON FACT SHEET, supra note 1.
53. Carolyn B. Sufin, Mitchell D. Creinin & Judy C. Chang, Incarcerated Women and
Abortion Provision: A Survey of Correctional Health Providers, 41 PERSPECTIVES ON
SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 6, 6 (March 2009), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/psrh/full/4100609.pdf.
54. Nicole Summer, Powerless in Prison: Sexual Abuse Against Incarcerated Women,
RH REALITY CHECK (Dec. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.rhrealitycheck.orgfblog/2007/12/11/powerless-in-prison-sexual-abuse-against-
incarcerated-women.
55. Sufrin, supra note 53, at 7-9.
56. Id.




"elective" medical care and require the inmate to obtain permission for the
procedure from prison officials or, in some cases, receive a court order al-
lowing the procedure.5 Some policies require counseling, a waiting period,
or similar hurdles before the procedure can be obtained.59 Fourteen states
have no official written abortion policy. 60 In these circumstances, abortion
policy is subject to the discretion of the prison administrators, and so poli-
cies may vary from prison to prison across the state. In addition to the poli-
cies within prison, inmates are also subjected to state abortion laws, which
may include additional mandatory waiting periods and reporting require-
ments. Furthermore, in Harris v. McRae, 6I the Supreme Court upheld the
Hyde Amendment, which restricted the use of federal funds for abortion
procedures. 62 This opened the door to allow states to restrict or deny fund-
ing for abortions. Even when medically necessary, only seventeen states use
state funds to provide for prisoners' abortions, and thirteen of these states do
so only because they have been ordered to by their courts.
63
Despite the growing number of female inmates, constitutional chal-
lenges to prison abortion policies have been limited. In Monmouth County
State Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 64 a class of prisoners
challenged a prison policy requiring a prisoner to have a court-ordered re-
lease in order to leave prison to obtain a non-therapeutic abortion.65 The
Third Circuit applied the Turner rationality test and held that the policy was
not rationally related to legitimate penological interests.66 It found that re-
quiring a woman to obtain a court order would create "additional delays in
scheduling the actual procedure" and such obstacles could create unneces-
sary risk.67 The court emphasized that in the case of many abortion proce-
dures time is of the essence, and unnecessary delays could essentially de-
prive the woman of her ability to exercise her constitutional right to
choose.68 Further, the court pointed out that no other medical procedure that
was considered "elective" by prison officials required a court order, which
undercut the prison's assertion that the policy was enacted out of adminis-
trative and financial concerns arising from providing funding and transpor-
58. Id. at 366-67.
59. Id. at 367.
60. Id. at 367-69.
61. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
62. Id. at 326-27.
63. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: STATE FUNDING OF ABORTION
UNDER MEDICAID (Mar. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibSFAM.pdf.
64. 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987).
65. Id. at 329.
66. Id. at 344.
67. Id. at 339-40.
68. Id. at 338-40.
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tation for unnecessary medical procedures. 69 The court went on to assert that
"'[s]ecurity is no less protected, crime is no less deterred, retribution is not
undermined, and rehabilitation is not hindered by... a prisoner's right to..
an abortion."'
70
The Fifth Circuit addressed a similar case but reached a different result
in Victoria W. v. Larpenter.71 In Victoria W., an inmate challenged the con-
stitutionality of a Louisiana prison policy that required women to get a court
order granting permission to receive an abortion.72 This procedure proved to
be difficult and time consuming, and by the time Victoria received her re-
lease she was past the point in her pregnancy where she could legally obtain
an abortion in Louisiana.73 Despite Victoria's difficulties, the policy at issue
was in theory less burdensome than the policy in Lanzaro, and it applied to
all "elective" medical procedures, not just "elective" abortions.74 The court
seized on these facts to distinguish Lanzaro and upheld the policy under the
Turner rationality test.
75
II. RoE V. CRA wFORD
A. Background
The conflicting circuit decisions of Victoria W. and Lanzaro reflected
the current state of prison abortion jurisprudence when Jane Roe entered a
Missouri prison on August 22, 2005.76 She had previously been admitted to
the Missouri Women's Eastern Reception Diagnostic and Correctional Cen-
ter (WERDCC) in January of 2005 on a drug charge.77 She was paroled four
months later but re-arrested later that year in California for a probation vi-
olation.78 Roe first learned of her pregnancy while awaiting extradition from
California to Missouri, but she was unable to obtain the procedure before
being sent to Missouri. 79 After her arrival at WERDCC, she repeatedly in-
formed the staff of her desire to have an abortion, but her requests were
69. Id. at 335.
70. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 338 (quoting Anne Vitale, Inmate Abortions-The Right to
Government Funding Behind Prison Gates, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 550, 556 (1980)).
71. 369 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2004).
72. Id. at 477-78.
73. Id. at 480.
74. Id. at 488.
75. Id. at 485.
76. Roe v. Crawford, 439 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (W.D. Mo. 2006).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 945-46.
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ultimately denied despite the fact that she was willing to pay for both the
procedure and the transportation to the medical facility.
80
Roe's unsuccessful attempt to secure permission to receive an abortion
was the result of a new Missouri Department of Corrections (MDC) policy
that was amended to authorize transportation for abortions only "[i]f '[the]
abortion is indicated due to threat to the mother's life or health, and if ap-
proved by the Medical Director in consultation with the Regional Medical
Director.''81 Unlike other "elective" procedures, which may be allowed if a
physician determines that the treatment should be administered, the MDC
policy prohibited any such determination by a physician in the case of an
"elective" abortion, effectively making the procedure unattainable.82 The
MDC claimed this policy addressed security concerns and provided cost
savings by reducing the number of opportunities for prisoners to be trans-
ported to and from prison grounds.83
By October, Roe was in the second trimester of her pregnancy. With
time running out for a legal abortion, she sought emergency relief from the
federal district court.84 The district court entered a preliminary injunction
ordering the prison to transport Roe for an abortion as soon as possible,
finding that it is well accepted that a substantial delay in the decision to
abort increases the risks associated with the procedure. 85 Prison officials
tried several times to stay the order, which ultimately proved unsuccessful
but further delayed Roe's access to the procedure.86 In a last ditch effort to
stop the procedure, the MDC appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States for an emergency stay. The appeal came in on a Friday evening to
Justice Clarence Thomas, who at the time was the acting Circuit Justice of
the Eighth Circuit. Justice Thomas, exercising his administrative jurisdic-
tion, granted an emergency stay blocking the procedure, which remained in
place over the weekend. When the full Court returned on Monday morning,
it immediately vacated the stay, giving Roe permission to carry out the pro-
cedure.87
After the procedure had been obtained, the district court certified the
class of which Roe was the lead plaintiff, challenging the legality of the
MDC policy on behalf of all similarly situated inmates throughout the
80. Id. at 946.
81. Id. at 946 (quoting Mo. Dep't of Corr. Policy IS 11-58).
82. Brief of Appellants at 6, Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-
3108).
83. Roe v. Crawford, 439 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949 (W.D. Mo. 2006).
84. Id. at 946.
85. Roe v. Crawford, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1043-45 (W.D. Mo. 2005).
86. Crawford, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 946.
87. Crawford v. Roe, 546 U.S. 959 (2005).
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state. 88 The district court then, after briefing, granted Roe summary judg-
ment, finding that the MDC policy failed under Turner's four-part test used
to determine the reasonableness of restrictions on inmates' freedom of
choice as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 89 The district court
also held that Roe's Eighth Amendment rights were violated, reasoning that
non-therapeutic abortion was a "serious medical need" regardless of wheth-
er the MDC chose to label it as "elective" and that the MDC policy inten-
tionally denied Roe access to treatment for this need.90
B. Eighth Circuit Analysis
After losing on summary judgment in the district court, the MDC ap-
pealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit.91 The court first addressed the
issue of the applicable test for determining the constitutionality of abortion
policy in the prison context.92 The district court had rejected Roe's argu-
ment that the proper standard of review was Casey's undue burden test in
favor of the Turner rationality test.93 The Eighth Circuit agreed, finding that
"Turner applies to prison restrictions relating to rights not typically subject
to strict scrutiny., 94 Casey's undue burden test, the court reasoned, is not a
test of strict scrutiny but rather applies a lesser standard of review, thereby
making it ineligible for the special deference granted to rights subject to
strict scrutiny that the Supreme Court established in Johnson v. California.
95
The court reasoned that abortion was more similar to the marriage re-
strictions that the Turner Court analyzed than the racial segregation policy
analyzed in Johnson.96 Providing access to marriage involves a burden on
the prison system to allocate resources to facilitate the ceremony, whereas
denying the prisons the ability to classify prisoners based on race creates no
similar burden on the system.97 Abortion, the court reasoned, falls into the
former category of rights, because it places additional financial and security
burdens on the prison system, and therefore the right to an abortion is "in-
consistent with proper incarceration." 98
88. Crawford, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 946.
89. Id. at 953.
90. Id.
91. Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 792 (8th Cir. 2008).
92. Id. at 793.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 794. This is a perfect example of the pernicious result of the "undue burden"
compromise, although the "undue burden" test is still more appropriate to the fundamental
right than the Turner "reasonableness of restriction" test.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Crawford, 514 F.3d at 794.
98. Id. at 793. Prison officials in Johnson argued that they needed the ability to segre-
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The district court found that the MDC policy failed under all four parts
of the Turner rationality test.99 The Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding that
the policy did not fail every prong of the test, but nevertheless found that
when balancing the overall interests under the test the MDC policy failed as
a whole.'00
To determine whether a prison regulation is reasonably related to a le-
gitimate penological interest under the four prongs of the Turner rationality
test, a court must consider (1) whether there exits a "valid, rational connec-
tion between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest
put forward to justify it[;]" (2) "whether there are alternative means of exer-
cising the right that remain open to prison inmates[;]" (3) "the impact ac-
commodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and
other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally[J" and (4)
the existence of obvious, easy alternatives that can fully accommodate the
inmate's rights at a "de minimis cost to valid penological interests."'
01
The Eighth Circuit first considered whether there was a reasonable re-
lationship between the policy and MDC's stated interests. The MDC as-
serted that removing an inmate from prison always presents a security risk,
and denying access to transportation for an abortion reduces the number of
inmates needing to be removed, thereby lowering the overall security
risk. 0 2 The problem with this argument, as the court pointed out, was that
the policy did not actually reduce the number of instances of inmates being
removed from the prison grounds. 10 3 An inmate without access to an abor-
tion would be forced to continue the pregnancy and as such would require
prenatal care throughout her term. 104 This care would require that the inmate
be transported from the prison to the appropriate medical facility on mul-
tiple occasions to monitor the pregnancy. Those inmates that remained in
prison throughout the entire length of their pregnancy would also need
transportation off-site for delivery.'0 6 The court concluded that the MDC
policy could not rationally be explained as reducing the number of off-site
transports for inmates.
0 7
The MDC further argued that the presence of protesters that often con-
gregated at the sole abortion clinic in the area presented a high risk to both
gate to control gang fighting and obviously disagreed with this Eighth Circuit analysis. John-
son v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 502 (2005).
99. Crawford, 514 F.3d at 795.
100. Id. at 798.
101. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).
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the guards and the inmates.' 08 Because of these problems, the MDC consi-
dered it of special importance to reduce the number of inmate transports to
the abortion facility.'0 9 Roe countered that in eight years under the current
system protesters had never once interfered with the transport of prison in-
mates to the facility. 10 The district court found that it was "undisputed that
in the past eight years [prior to the judgment], picketers had never interfered
with the safety or security of [MDC] inmates or staff."' The appellate court
did not find this convincing, reasoning that prison officials should be able to
anticipate problems and adopt solutions before such problems actually oc-
cur.1 2 Roe further argued that this created an impermissible "heckler's ve-
to" by allowing the protesters to block the exercise of a legally protected
activity." 3 Without elaborating, the court found that the "heckler's veto"
argument was inapplicable in the prison context where the government is
granted far more deference than the government would be granted when
dealing with the general public. 1
4
In sum, the court found that simply because no problems had occurred
in the past did not make the MDC policy irrational as applied to the special
circumstances of abortion. The inquiry did not end there. The court went on
to analyze the policy under the remaining three prongs of the Turner ratio-
nality test. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that under the
second prong of the test, which considered the possibility of alternative
ways to exercise the right, the MDC policy "entirely eliminated Plaintiff's
access to elective abortions."' 15 The MDC argued that an alternative option
would be to obtain the abortion before incarceration, but the court appro-
priately dismissed this option as unrealistic. 16 The court went on to state
that there is "no authority.. . indicating the Supreme Court has determined
a right may be entirely eliminated during incarceration .... ,01 7 The court
also distinguished the MDC's policy from the policy upheld by the Fifth
Circuit in Victoria W., which the Eighth Circuit claimed merely "created an
administrative hurdle" by requiring court authorization rather than authoriz-
ing a complete ban. 18 The MDC policy was more comparable to the policy
struck down in Lanzaro, which, by requiring an inmate to receive a court
108. Crawford, 514 F.3d at 795.
109. Id.
110. Id. at796.
111. Roe v. Crawford, 439 F. Supp. 2d 942, 950 (W.D. Mo. 2006).
112. Id.
113. Crawford, 514 F.3d at 796.
114. Id.
115. Id. Note that this is the equivalent of finding an "undue burden."





ordered release from prison, all but eliminated the possibility of accessing
the procedure." 
9
In regard to the impact on prison staff and the allocation of prison re-
sources that requiring transportation of inmates for abortions would have,
the court referred to its earlier finding that the policy did not logically dimi-
nish prison security concerns and the MDC itself admitted that costs savings
from the policy would be "minimal ... as compared to [its] general budg-
et." 1 20 Finally, the court addressed whether there existed "ready alterna-
tives" to accommodate pregnant inmates at minimal cost to the prison sys-
tem and found that the previous MDC policy that allowed transportation for
elective abortion procedures represented such an alternative. 121 The court
went on to state (in dicta) that even a more intrusive policy such as the one
upheld in Victoria W. could be a viable alternative. 122 After disposing of the
case under the Turner rationality test, the court went on to reject the district
court's finding that the MDC policy violated the Eighth Amendment prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment, finding that an "elective" abor-
tion was not a "serious medical need" within the context of the Eighth
Amendment that would require prison officials to take affirmative action.
123
The holding of the Eighth Circuit in Roe v. Crawford revived the per-
ceived circuit split created by Victoria W. and Lanzaro. Although the court
came down on the side of upholding the fundamental right of a woman to
choose in the prison context, the decision left open major loopholes that in
the future could be exploited by prison officials when crafting abortion poli-
cy. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court did not believe any per-
ceived split worthy of granting certiorari review, and denied the State's peti-
tion.' 24 The remainder of this article will consider how these loopholes can
be closed to prevent future abuse by prison systems and assure that a wom-
an's right to choose does not disappear when the cell door closes.
119. Crawford, 514 F.3d at 797.
120. Id. at 798.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 798-801.
124. Crawford v. Roe, 129 S.Ct. 109 (2008).
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III. PRISON ABORTION POLICIES SHOULD BE ANALYZED UNDER CASEY'S
UNDUE BURDEN TEST RATHER THAN THE TURNER RATIONALITY TEST
A. Application of Johnson v. California in the Context of Freedom of
Choice
When Roe presented her case to the district court, she argued that un-
der the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. California,'25 policies that
restrict freedom of choice in prison should be subject to the same standard
of review that applies to the right to choose outside of prison. 26 The funda-
mental nature of the right should place it above the governmental interest in
prison administration. Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit rejected
this argument, reasoning that Johnson protects only restrictions that would
be subject to strict scrutiny outside the prison context, such as racial classi-
fications, not restrictions that would merely be subject to an "undue burden"
test. A closer reading of Johnson, however, seems to indicate that the deci-
sion applies to all rights that are not "inconsistent with proper incarcera-
tion," regardless of what standard of review they are accorded outside of
prisons.
Johnson v. California, decided just two years before Roe v. Crawford,
was the first case since the development of the Turner rationality test to find
that the test was not appropriate to evaluate prison policy in certain circums-
tances. 127 In Johnson, an African-American state prison inmate challenged,
under the Equal Protection Clause, an unwritten policy of segregating new
inmates by race during the first sixty days of incarceration. 128 The prison
officials argued that the policy prevented racially motivated gang violence,
and the Ninth Circuit upheld the practice, finding it to be rational under the
Turner test. 129 On appeal the Supreme Court of the United States reversed,
holding that strict scrutiny, not the Turner test, was the proper standard of
review. 130
The Court reasoned that racial classifications are always "immediately
suspect," and therefore all racial classifications imposed by the government
must be analyzed under strict scrutiny.' 3 1 The Court refused to find an ex-
ception for prisoners under the Turner rationality test, which allowed for
such a policy to be reviewed under a rational basis test. 132 In Turner, the
125. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
126. Roe v. Crawford, 439 F. Supp. 2d 942, 943-48 (W.D. Mo. 2006).
127. See Johnson, 543 U.S. 499.
128. Id. at 503.
129. Id. at 504.
130. Id. at 515.




right to marry was at issue, and the Court held that because marriage was
not consistent with incarceration policies, restricting marriage need only be
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.1 33 Unlike the right to
marry, which necessarily involves access to the prisoner by another person,
equal protection is not "inconsistent with proper incarceration" because
"[t]he right not to be discriminated against based on one's race... is not a
right that need necessarily be compromised for the sake of proper prison
administration."'
134
Part of the Court's concern over racial classifications was that such
classifications "raise special fears that they are motivated by an invidious
purpose.'35 To avoid such application, the Court determined that a mere
rationality test was not appropriate because it could not "'smoke out' illegi-
timate uses of race," which was particularly important in the prison context
where "the government's power is at its apex."'136 In his dissent, Justice
Thomas predictably argued that determining the appropriateness of race-
based policies is "better left in the first instance to the officials who run our
Nation's prisons" and the deferential Turner rationality test should therefore
remain the correct standard. 137 The Court found that this standard was "too
lenient" and would allow the use of race-based policies that in practice do
not advance the prison's stated interests. 
38
Notably, in the Johnson opinion, the Court mentioned a list of rights it
considered inconsistent with proper incarceration and therefore still suscept-
ible to the Turner test. 39 Along with marriage restrictions, this list included
the freedom of association, limits on correspondence, restrictions on access
to the courts, restrictions on receiving certain publications, limitations on
attending religious services during work hours, and regulations regarding
mentally ill prisoners. 140 Conspicuously missing from this list is any right
that involves the access to healthcare. Instead, the common thread that runs
through these inconsistent rights is that they require the prison to give the
inmate a greater amount of autonomy than would normally be expected in
prison. This differs from medical care and treatment, which under the
Eighth Amendment is not one of the rights forfeited upon entering prison.
This inconsistency of analysis is further evidenced by the fact that Eighth
133. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 98-90 (1987).
134. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510.
135. Id. at 505.
136. Id. at 506-10.
137. Id. at 542 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 513.
139. Seeid. at510.
140. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510.
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Amendment claims, like Equal Protection claims, are not analyzed under
the Turner rationality test.1
41
Putting aside the Eighth Amendment argument for now, if abortion is
considered a medical procedure, which it is, and medical procedures are not
inconsistent with proper incarceration, then abortion is not inconsistent with
proper incarceration and should therefore fall under Johnson v. California's
exception to the Turner rationality test. 42 Clearly a prison will take care of
a pregnant inmate's medical needs by providing her with obstetrical care
throughout the pregnancy and transporting her off-site when necessary for
treatment and delivery. It is unreasonable to think that providing access to
abortion should be viewed any differently, particularly because it often in-
volves less off-site travel and less expense than would be required if the
pregnancy was carried to term. In the majority of prison abortions the in-
mate is required to travel off-site only once to obtain the procedure, and in
many cases is required to pay for the procedure herself. Pregnancy requires
several off-site trips and the state is required to pay for the care.
Allowing inmates access to abortion procedures is even less disruptive
of proper incarceration than the equal protection requirements protected in
Johnson. If a prison with severe race-related problems is required to remain
integrated, it will be arguably more difficult to quell violence between dif-
ferent populations. In Johnson, the department of corrections was able to
cite to five major prison gangs based along racial lines within its prisons and
numerous instances of violence between the groups. 143 It further stated that
it expected such violence to continue and to be inflamed if the prisons were
required to integrate. 144 Despite the overwhelming evidence that racial inte-
gration could generate more violence, create a more dangerous environment
for the prison guards, and generally disrupt prison administration, the Court
insisted that equal protection and the right not to be segregated was not in-
consistent with proper incarceration. The impact of abortion procedures on
effective prison administration seems minute by comparison.
Allowing a woman to receive an abortion does not defeat the penologi-
cal objectives of prison administrators anymore than allowing her to receive
an appendectomy or other type of routine medical care would.145 One stated
objective of imprisonment is to rehabilitate the offender. Forcing an inmate
to give birth to a child she does not want is not consistent with this goal.
Such an action can only serve to add to the anguish she is already expe-
141. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976).
142. See Elizabeth Budnitz, Note, Not a Part of Her Sentence: Applying the Supreme
Court's Johnson v. California to Prison Abortion Policies, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1291 (2006).
143. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 502.
144. Id. at 503.
145. Budnitz, supra note 142, at 1322.
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riencing and possibly increase her hostility towards the prison system and
society in general. In the worst-case scenario, she may take it upon herself
to obtain an illegal abortion while in prison. None of these outcomes can
possibly be considered rehabilitative. 1
46
A second objective of imprisonment, punishment, cannot logically be
achieved by denying access to abortions either. 147 Even if it could be argued
that imprisonment requires that a woman should be forced to lose her free-
dom to choose what happens to her body, this argument would fail under an
equal protection argument because it is a punishment that solely affects fe-
male inmates. 148 The result would be particularly egregious in the numerous
instances where the state, through deliberate indifference, allows a woman
to be inseminated while incarcerated.
In Johnson, the Supreme Court expressed special concern over racially
discriminatory policies that reflect underlying improper motives of prison
officials. 149 The Court reasoned that race was a particularly sensitive and
controversial issue, so much so that Turner's standard was "too lenient" to
protect from "invidious uses of race" within the prison. 150 The Court was
generally concerned that if prison administrators or officials held racist
views, these views would be able to slip unnoticed into prison policy with-
out a strict standard of review to safeguard equal protection.' 51
This reasoning applies with equal force to abortion policy. Abortion is
a polarizing topic, and many people feel strongly one way or the other about
the issue. Arguably, the ability to effectively use prison policy to block a
procedure that some find objectionable creates a strong incentive for those
who oppose the practice to find reasons to deny or hinder the procedure,
even when such reasons are exaggerated or speculative. Under the Turner
rationality test, such improper motives could easily be justified through de-
ference to prison officials' expertise on efficient operation of the prison
system. This is particularly dangerous given the fact that these policies are
often implemented by men who may not fully understand the implications
of denying the freedom of choice to female inmates. The right to choose is a
constitutional right whether one agrees with it or not and should not be sub-
ject to the deference of prison officials.
Finding that the Turner rationality test, rather than Casey's undue bur-
den standard, should govern freedom of choice analysis diminishes the right
to choose in the prison setting. Such a result misstates the holding in John-
son as applying only to rights that are normally protected by strict scrutiny.
146. Id. at 1325.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 513 (2005).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 513-14.
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The Johnson exception applies to rights not inconsistent with proper incar-
ceration, regardless of the type of scrutiny the right may receive outside the
prison walls. Strict scrutiny is implicated in the Johnson opinion only be-
cause racial equality is not inconsistent with imprisonment, and any prison
policy that interferes with racial equality must be analyzed under the same
strict scrutiny standard that would apply outside of the prison context. Simi-
larly, because access to abortion is not inconsistent with proper incarcera-
tion, it must be analyzed under the same "undue burden" test that would
normally apply to abortion regulations outside of prison.
Supporters of restrictions also point to the fact that "access to abortion
involves burdens on the prison system concerning allocation of resources
that necessitate either allowing inmates out of the prison setting, or bringing
persons into the facilities."' 52 The premise of this statement is that, unlike
simply refraining from classifying prisoners on the basis of race, which
creates no burden, these additional burdens make abortion inconsistent with
proper prison administration. The premise is false. First, the premise ignores
that, in most cases, providing an abortion will be less burdensome on prison
administration than maintaining the pregnancy because it requires fewer
trips off-site and less expenditure of state funds, as the Eighth Circuit
found. 153 Second, the premise erroneously determines that any right that
requires more than refraining from a certain action by prison officials
creates a burden that renders it inconsistent with incarceration. This is simp-
ly not the case, as is evidenced by the medical care that generally is pro-
vided to inmates. Clearly, providing such care is a burden on the staff, but
that does not make it inconsistent with incarceration. Whatever burden is
created by allowing access to abortion is no different than the incidental
burdens that are created whenever the state must pay for and transport an
inmate to receive other medical care off-site; accordingly, those burdens are
not sufficient to make the availability of abortion inconsistent with proper
incarceration.
B. Evaluating Abortion Policy Under Casey Produces Fairer Results
Because abortion is not inconsistent with proper incarceration, Casey's
"undue burden" standard should be applied to any prison policy regulating
abortion rather than the Turner rationality test. This standard still allows for
deference to prison officials, but at the same time serves to better protect the
constitutional rights of an incarcerated woman. Furthermore, a higher stan-
dard of review helps to eliminate the possibility that prison policy be used
as a pretext for mandating a certain set of values on the prison population.




Finally, under Casey it is of no consequence that the abortion be considered
"elective" or medically necessary. Casey's protections were geared specifi-
cally towards "elective" abortions; medically necessary abortions enjoy
much broader protection. Therefore, by applying Casey, prisons will no
longer be allowed to distinguish between the two types of procedures by
allowing one type and denying the other.
The policy in Roe v. Crawford would have easily been defeated under
Casey's undue burden test:
A finding of an undue burden is shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute
with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to
further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the
woman's free choice, not hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering
the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the ef-
fect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice
cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate
ends. 154
Clearly a policy such as the one instituted by the MDC, which com-
pletely prohibited any elective abortion, would constitute not just a substan-
tial obstacle but an absolute obstacle. Whatever interests the MDC had to
support this policy, whether legitimate or not, prohibiting abortion is never
"a permissible means" of serving those interests.
Another important question is how far prisons can go before their ac-
tions become a substantial obstacle. Casey has proven not to be an impe-
netrable barrier to abortion regulation. Under Casey, laws requiring in-
formed consent, waiting periods, and parental consent have all been
upheld. 155 Therefore, it is likely that prisons would still be able to place
some restrictions on access to abortion as long as such restrictions do not
interfere too greatly with the woman's right to choose. Waiting periods,
mandatory counseling, and informed consent could be considered constitu-
tional within the prison setting, just as they are on the outside.
A more troublesome question arises when prisons require certain judi-
cial procedures before allowing an inmate to receive an abortion. This was
the case in both Victoria W. and Lanzaro, which required a court order for
the abortion'5 6 and a court-ordered release to travel to the abortion clinic,'57
154. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883, 877 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion).
155. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
156. Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 205 F. Supp. 2d 580, 598 (E.D. La. 2002).
157. Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 351 (3d
Cir. 1987).
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respectively. If prison officials can show that these types of requirements
help prison security or administration, deference may be given to these offi-
cials as long as such restrictions do not in practical effect delay receiving
the procedure until it is no longer legally attainable. Under Casey, however,
any similar kind of obstacle that did not purport to eliminate access to abor-
tion but in effect prevented it from taking place would be impermissible.
This is of particular importance since the Eighth Circuit suggested in Craw-
ford that requiring an inmate to obtain a court order authorizing an abortion
would constitute a "ready alternative" to a complete ban on the proce-
dure. 158 This presumes that an inmate can gain ready access to a court with-
out being deterred by prison officials. This was not the actual case in Craw-
ford. Prisons can still regulate abortions to achieve effective prison adminis-
tration under Casey; they simply must do so in a way that does not result in
a complete denial of access or an unreasonable delay.
C. Even if the Courts Continue to Apply the Turner Rationality Test, No
Rational Relationship Exists Between Preventing Access to Inmate
Abortions and a Legitimate State Interest
The Eighth Circuit struck down the MDC policy in Roe v. Crawford
under the more deferential Turner standard because the MDC failed to show
that the regulations were reasonably related to legitimate penological inter-
ests. Such interests include deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners,
and institutional security. The court concluded that the MDC policy failed
three of the four prongs of the Turner test, which, the court concluded, was
enough to find the regulation invalid, but the court did find that the MDC
policy had a rational relationship to the legitimate concern about the heigh-
tened risks for guards and inmates while visiting an abortion clinic.' 59 Al-
though this finding was ultimately non-determinative in Crawford, it has
potential implications for future prisoner freedom-of-choice cases and
should be addressed.
The MDC cited concerns about protesters that were often outside of
the local abortion clinic picketing, taking license plate numbers, and video-
taping vehicles as they entered. 60 The MDC reasoned that these activities
made it more difficult to transport inmates to an abortion facility than to a
regular medical facility. Although in her brief Roe acknowledged the pres-
ence of the protesters on many occasions at the facility, she offered evi-
dence that in eight years of transporting prisoners "picketers have never
158. Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d, 789, 798 (8th Cir. 2008).
159. Id. at 795-98.
160. Id. at 795.
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interfered with the safety or security of ... inmates or staff.' 16 ' There had
never once been any instance of threats, vandalism, disruptions, or alterca-
tions. Furthermore, Roe pointed out that the presence of protesters "was not
one of the considerations at the time the Policy was formulated and imple-
mented" but only during litigation became the MDC's primary justification
for its enforcement. 62 When presented with this evidence the district court
rightly concluded that the MDC "fail[ed] to present any material fact show-
ing that the presence of picketers [has] in fact increas[ed] security con-
cerns."
163
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with this assessment, finding that the dis-
trict court "erred in finding the MDC policy is irrational simply because no
problems occurred in the past."'164 Citing deference to prison administrators,
the court took them at their word that traveling to the abortion clinic was
dangerous, despite no evidence of actual past or threatened future danger.
165
The court reasoned that "[p]rison officials should not be required to wait
until a problem occurs before addressing the risk."' 166 The difficulty with
this analysis is that it allows the curtailment of any constitutional right
based purely on conjecture, speculation, and post hoc rationalization. It also
ignores the obvious fabrication of the prison official's concern. As the dis-
trict court pointed out, every time a prisoner is transported, for whatever
reason, a variety of security concerns are raised, and "the undisputed evi-
dence shows that inmates who choose to terminate a pregnancy and must be
transported outside of prison for that purpose pose no greater security risk
than any other inmate that requires outside medical attention."' 167 In all of
the cases not involving abortion, prison officials have been able to handle
the risks and have managed to take literally thousands of prisoners off-site
over the years without incident. 168 By allowing such complete deference
towards prison officials without requiring any evidence to support their
claims, the Eighth Circuit leaves the door wide open for future policy chal-
lenges to be dismissed under the Turner rationality test merely because
prison officials were able to invent some rationale for the policy after the
fact.
161. Id.
162. BriefofRespondent-Appellees at 31, Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2008)
(No. 06-3108).
163. Roe v. Crawford, 439 F. Supp. 2d 942, 950 (W.D. Mo. 2006).
164. Crawford, 514 F.3d at 796.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 795.
167. Crawford, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 950.
168. Brief of Respondent-Appellees at 31-33, Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789 (8th Cir.
2008) (No. 06-3108).
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The Eighth Circuit found that the occasional presence of protesters at
abortion clinics was enough to make a transport for an abortion more peril-
ous than transport for other types of medical procedures. 169 Regardless of
whether this is the reality, allowing protesters to influence a decision about
constitutional rights creates an impermissible "heckler's veto" by allowing
them to effectively block access to a legally-protected activity. A heckler's
veto traditionally arises when a party's freedom of speech is curtailed or
restricted to prevent another party from reacting negatively to such speech
and thereby creating a threat of interruption, protest, or violence. 7° Normal-
ly a heckler's veto is not allowed to suppress speech unless the speech itself
incites violence or lawless action. Ironically, the actions of the abortion
protesters are protected from a heckler's veto; they may continue to exercise
their freedom of assembly and expression even if it creates the potential for
hostility from opposing groups. The Eighth Circuit, however, concluded
that protection from a heckler's veto is only applicable as it relates to the
general public.
171
Unlike when dealing with the general public, in the prison context the
validity of infringement on constitutional rights depends only on the Turner
rationality test that grants far more deference to prison administrators than
would be given to the government when dealing with the general populace.
As such, prison administrators may defer to a heckler's veto when the gov-
ernment otherwise could not. This does not pass constitutional muster on
any level. If prison officials were truly concerned, their concern would war-
rant a legitimate time and place restriction on the protesters so that the pris-
on officials could get the inmate in and out of the facility. 172 Prison officials
could easily solve the problem, if it truly existed, by removing protesters for
the few hours a prisoner is brought to a site, certainly a reasonable time and
place restriction under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 173 This would
alleviate the excuse used to deny the pregnant woman her constitutional
rights and place a minimum restriction on the protesters' constitutional
rights, rather than an outright prohibition on the pregnant woman's constitu-
tional rights.
169. Crawford, 514 F.3d at 795.
170. Lewis v. Wilson, 253 F.3d 1077, 1081-82 (8th Cir. 2001).
171. Crawford, 514 F.3d at 796.
172. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
("[A] state may... enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which
are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.").
173. Cf. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (finding that
tailored injunctions are appropriate measures to protect patients from the possible physical
harm that targeting picketing could spawn).
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IV. PRISON POLICES THAT DENY ACCESS TO ABORTION VIOLATE THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT BAR AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
A. Estelle v. Gamble: Establishing the Medical Test for Cruel and Un-
usual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution simply states
that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."'174 Historically, this provision was
read to prohibit "'torture(s)' and other 'barbar(ous)' methods of punish-
ment."' 175 As constitutional understanding evolved, courts began to read this
amendment as embodying "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civi-
lized standards, humanity, and decency" and prohibiting "punishments
which are incompatible with 'the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.' ,1 76 With this understanding, the courts
required prisons to provide medical care and treatment for incarcerated
prisoners, reasoning that denial of medical treatment may result in "torture
or lingering death" or "result in pain and suffering which no one suggests
would serve any penological purpose."1 77 Such suffering is "inconsistent
with contemporary standards of decency" under the view that the "public be
required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of
[her] liberty, care for [herself].' 78
The current analysis of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
in the context of medical care was defined in the Supreme Court case Es-
telle v. Gamble. 79 In Estelle, a prisoner filed a complaint against prison
officials claiming that the officials' failure to provide him adequate medical
care for a back injury was cruel and unusual punishment.' 80 The Court held
that "deliberate indifference" by prison doctors or prison staff to the "se-
rious medical needs" of prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment. 8 ' This
includes both "denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally
interfering with the treatment once prescribed."1 82 Since Estelle, inmates'
claims of cruel and unusual punishment in the medical arena have been ana-
lyzed under a two prong test: (1) the inmate must show an objectively se-
rious medical need, and (2) the inmate must show that the prison was deli-
174. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
175. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 103.
178. Id. at 103-04.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 100.
181. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
182. Id. at 104-05.
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berately indifferent to that need.18 3 Deliberate indifference requires that of-
ficials act knowingly to prevent, deny, or delay treatment; mere negligence
will not suffice. 84 What is considered a serious medical need is less clear.
Courts have defined it in several different ways: treatment that "cannot be
postponed [without] far-reaching consequences," a medical need that, if not
treated, will create "irreparable consequences," or a need "that has been
diagnosed by a physician as requesting treatment or one that is so obvious
that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's atten-
tion."185 Under any of these definitions, termination of a pregnancy easily
qualifies.
The cases analyzing the right to an abortion in prison under the Eighth
Amendment, however, have been relatively few and have produced mixed
results. In Bryant v. Maffucci,i8 6 the Second Circuit held that prison offi-
cials' failure to arrange for an abortion before the time limit for legally ob-
taining the procedure had passed did not violate the inmate's rights.18 7 After
the inmate was admitted she was given a sonogram that indicated she was in
her twenty-first week of pregnancy.188 State law prohibited abortions after
twenty-four weeks, so prison officials arranged an appointment for the pro-
cedure two weeks later, the earliest time the hospital had available.18 9 At
that appointment, a new sonogram revealed that the inmate was actually
twenty-four weeks into her pregnancy, and the hospital refused to carry out
the procedure. 90 The Second Circuit found that this was mere negligence on
the part of prison officials and did not rise to the level of deliberate indiffe-
rence required to show a violation of the Eighth Amendment.' 9'
A similar case arose in the Sixth Circuit that same year. In Gibson v.
Matthews,'92 the court held that the prison did not violate the inmate's rights
by refusing to provide her with an abortion when she arrived in prison twen-
ty-three weeks pregnant. 93 Prior to her arrival at the prison that denied her
the procedure, she had been moved to several different federal prison facili-
ties and at each of them she had asked to obtain an abortion.' 94 Because
none of the prisons were located near abortion providers, she had to be
183. Id. at 106.
184. Id.
185. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979); Monmouth County Corr. Institutional
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).
186. 923 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1991).
187. Id. at 980.
188. Id.
189. Id. at980-81.
190. Id. at 981.
191. Id. at 983-84.
192. 926 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1991).
193. Id. at 534-35.
194. Id. at 534.
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transferred to a prison that had access to an abortion facility, and by this
point it was too late in her pregnancy. 95 The court noted that the inmate
was a "victim of the bureaucracy as a whole" and therefore none of the in-
dividual defendants could be held liable.196 The Second Circuit did find,
however, that abortion was a serious medical need under the Eighth
Amendment and the inmate's claim failed only because bureaucratic negli-
gence could not be considered deliberate indifference.'
97
The Third Circuit was the first to find a prison's abortion policy vi-
olated the Eighth Amendment. In Lanzaro, inmates claimed that the prison
had an affirmative duty to attend to serious medical needs, including abor-
tion, and that denial of elective abortions was a breach of this duty.' 98 The
prison countered that "elective" procedures were beyond the scope of its
duty and likened such procedures to "an inmate who desires a facelift or the
removal of varicose veins purely for cosmetic reasons."1 99 The Third Circuit
rejected the idea that classifying a procedure as "elective" disqualifies it as a
serious medical need because denial of abortion care will result in "tangible
harm., 200 The court then found that the burdensome procedure of requiring
a court-ordered release as a precondition to exercising the right to choose
constituted deliberate indifference towards the serious medical need that
accompanies a request to exercise this right.
20'
B. The Eighth Amendment Holdings in Roe v. Crawford
The district court in Roe v. Crawford found the reasoning in Lanzaro
persuasive and held that the MDC policy prohibiting all elective abortions
violated the Eighth Amendment.20 2 As the correctional facility argued in
Lanzaro, the MDC argued that an "elective" abortion can never constitute a
"serious medical need," but the district court rejected the idea that merely
labeling a procedure "elective" takes away all Eighth Amendment scrutiny,
just as the Lanzaro court did.203 Once the court determined that abortion
should be considered a "serious medical need," it clearly followed that a
policy designed to restrict all access to that procedure qualified as deliberate
195. Id.
196. Id. at 534-35.
197. Id. at 536.
198. Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 344 (3d
Cir. 1987).
199. Id. at 345.
200. Id. at 347.
201. Id.
202. Roe v. Crawford, 439 F. Supp. 942, 953 (W.D. Mo. 2006).
203. Id.
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indifference on the part of prison administrators because they had to have
been aware of the consequences of their actions. 2 4
The Eighth Circuit did not agree with the district court and overturned
this part of the ruling, citing "recent developments in the law., 20 5 The court
referenced the 2002 district court case that preceded the Fifth Circuit deci-
sion in Victoria W., which held that "[a]n elective abortion sought for non-
medical reasons... is simply lacking in similarity and intensity to the other
medical conditions that have been found to be serious medical needs under
the Eighth Amendment., 20 6 The district court in Victoria W. likened the
harm caused by denial of an abortion procedure to be merely that of "incon-
venience and financial drain., 20 7 The Eighth Circuit acknowledged this
holding to be in conflict with the Third Circuit in Lanzaro, but reasoned that
the court in that case did not come to a conclusive interpretation of what
constituted a "serious medical need., 20 8 The concurring opinion required to
create a majority in Lanzaro stopped short of finding that a request for an
"elective" procedure could place an affirmative duty on prisons to provide
such procedures or risk violating the Eighth Amendment. 20 9 As such, the
Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Third Circuit had not conclusively estab-
lished the definition of "serious medical need." 210
Victoria W also had similar precedential problems. Although the dis-
trict court in Victoria W. took a firm stance in finding no violation of the
Eighth Amendment, on appeal the Fifth Circuit failed to adopt the reasoning
of the district court and instead found that the policy did not violate the
Eighth Amendment under the Turner rationality test. 211 Therefore, the Fifth
Circuit discounted the district court's rigid Eighth Amendment analysis and
failed to analyze the Eighth Amendment claim under the correct standard of
review as declared in Estelle v. Gamble.
Finding neither Victoria W. nor Lanzaro to conclusively settle the is-
sue, the Eighth Circuit looked to Supreme Court precedent. Citing Rust v.
Sullivan,21 2 the court found that "[t]he Supreme Court has made it clear the
state has no affirmative duty to provide, fund, or help procure an abortion
for any member of the general population., 213 Finding that the views articu-
204. Id.
205. Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 798 (8th Cir. 2008).
206. Id. at 799 (quoting Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 205 F. Supp. 2d 580, 600-01 (E.D. La.
2002)).
207. Id. (quoting Victoria W, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 601).
208. Id. at 800.
209. See Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 352-
55 (3d Cir. 1987) (Mansmann, J., concurring).
210. Crawford, 514 F.3d at 800.
211. Id. at 799 n.8.
212. 500U.S. 173 (1991).
213. Crawford, 514 F.3d at 800.
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lated by the district court in Victoria W. were more consistent with Supreme
Court precedent, the court concluded that "elective" abortion does not con-
stitute a serious medical need and, therefore, denial of access to the proce-
dure does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.
C. The Eighth Amendment Should Apply to Prison Abortion Policies
Just as the MDC policy in Crawford did not reasonably relate to a legi-
timate penological interest, the policy also should have failed under Es-
telle's Eighth Amendment test. According to the Estelle Court, the State is
obligated "to provide medical care for those whom it ... incarcerat[es],"
and "[i]ntentionally denying or delaying access to medical care" constitutes
an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. 214 Pregnancy termination is
a vital option of medical care for pregnant women and as such falls within
the category of serious medical need safeguarded by the Eighth Amend-
ment.
1. The Desire to Obtain Abortion Care Is a "Serious Medical Need"
Access to abortion care is a "serious medical need" because denial of
the procedure will ultimately result in irreversible consequences, the treat-
ment cannot be postponed without creating those consequences, and the
need for the assistance of a physician is obvious to even the most naYve of
lay persons.21 5 Without such treatment, the inmate will be forced against her
will to continue the pregnancy until she either miscarries or gives birth, or
may even be tempted to abort without medical care at all. There is substan-
tially less risk of death and serious medical complications associated with a
timely medical abortion procedure than there is carrying a pregnancy to
216term. Women are "at least ten times more likely to die from continuing a
pregnancy through childbirth than from induced abortion., 217 The risk of
carrying the pregnancy to term is even greater where the pregnancy is
deemed "high-risk., 21 8 Women in prison are especially susceptible to high-
risk pregnancies resulting from inadequate access to prenatal care, sub-
stance abuse problems, and nutritional deficiencies. 1 9 Woman inmates also
214. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
215. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1973).




219. See National Commission on Correctional Health Care Guideline P-G-07 [hereinaf-
ter NCCHC Guideline], cited by the State of Missouri prison guidelines in their regulations,
and conceded in their testimony.
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have much higher rates of HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases that
can endanger pregnancies.22°
Further, the pain and discomfort of childbirth is amplified in the prison
environment. Numerous stories exist of women prisoners shackled or hand-
cuffed during labor and while giving birth.221 This type of treatment is not
only humiliating; it is dangerous for both the mother and child during deli-
very, which requires mobility and adaptability. 222 Denying abortion care
forces women to undergo this type of treatment during labor. The psycho-
logical implications of forced motherhood can also be debilitating. Infants
are often separated from their mothers soon after birth and given to a family
member or put in foster care. For inmates with longer sentences, this means
that they do not have the chance to develop a meaningful relationship with
their child during its formative years, or at all. Inmates with shorter sen-
tences, the majority of whom are already single parents, upon release must
return to life outside the prison with another child who requires care. In
Estelle, the Supreme Court noted that the Eighth Amendment should reflect
"broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and
decency.''223 Forcing women to carry out unwanted pregnancies is not com-
patible with these concepts, particularly when there exists a safe way to
alleviate the situation. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the choice to
terminate pregnancy as a constitutional right; therefore it is not up to admin-
istrative agencies to impose their moral opposition to the right upon the
inmates who are left in their charge. The right to choose is the law of the
land.
Levels of physical and psychological pain far less severe than those
caused by denial of termination of pregnancy have been deemed worthy of
Eighth Amendment protection. In Brooks v. Berg,224 a New York court
found a treatment for gender identity disorder was a "serious medical
need. 225 A Fourth Circuit case, Oldham v. Beck, 226 held that avoiding ex-
posure to second-hand smoke could be a "serious medical need., 227 A Penn-
220. See Effectiveness of Interventions to Address HIV in Prisons 16, 19, World Health
Organization, 2007.
221. See generally AMNESTY INT'L USA, WOMEN IN PRISON (2008), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/violence-against-women/abuse-of-women-in-custody/women-in-
prison/page.do?id = 1108246.
222. See Angela Thomas, Inmate Access to Elective Abortion: Social Policy, Medicine
and the Law, 19 HEALTH MATRIx 539, 559 (Spring 2009).
223. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
224. 270 F. Supp. 2d 302 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 289 F. Supp. 2d
286 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
225. Id. at 309-12.
226. 75 F. App'x 122 (4th Cir. 2003).
227. Id. at 125.
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sylvania court in Petrichko v. Kurtz228 held that a dislocated shoulder was a
"serious medical need., 229 Many courts, including the Fourth Circuit in
Webb v. Driver, 230 have found that a hernia qualifies as a "serious medical
need.",23' The list of cases goes on and includes all types of maladies from
fractured ankles, to broken ribs, to inadequate dental care. Given that all of
these conditions qualify as "serious medical needs" for Eighth Amendment
purposes, it is unreasonable to deny that relief from pregnancy is just as
worthy given pregnancy's potential for severe pain, discomfort, or even
death, and its irreparable consequences.
Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence also indicates that the desire to
obtain an abortion is a serious medical need. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme
Court discussed the implications of denying a woman the right to choose:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by
denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm med-
ically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity,
or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical
health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all con-
cerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of
bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and oth-
erwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional diffi-
culties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
232
The stress caused by forced motherhood, concern for the mental and
physical health of the mother, and the future implications of having an un-
wanted child were severe enough to convince the Court to qualify abortion
as a fundamental right.233
Finally, the treatment of pregnant inmates shows a general agreement
that, abortion aside, prison officials consider pregnancy itself a "serious
medical need." A pregnant inmate has a right to comprehensive treatment
and preventative care during the duration of the pregnancy. This treatment
is normally guided by the health standards enacted by the National Com-
mission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC), which directs that medical
care for pregnant inmates should be "in accordance with their expressed
desires regarding their pregnancy, whether they elect to keep the child, use
adoption services, or have an abortion. 234 In Crawford, prison officials who
228. 52 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
229. Id. at 507-08.
230. 313 F. App'x 591 (4th Cir. 2008).
231. Id. at 593.
232. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
233. Id. at 153-54.
234. NCCHC Guideline P-G-10.
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admitted to adhering to the NCCHC standards recognized that pregnancy
was a "serious medical need" but disputed that an abortion procedure could
ever fit that definition when medically unnecessary. Officials confused the
condition with treatment. Pregnancy is a "serious medical need" that under
the Eighth Amendment must be treated while in prison. Under the NCCHC
standards, abortion is one of the treatment options available. Because the
condition of pregnancy clearly constitutes a "serious medical need" and
because abortion is the safest way of relieving this need, a denial of this
constitutionally protected option violates the Eighth Amendment. To argue
otherwise would be analogous to allowing a prison that provided medical
care for all medical conditions but permitted only the most painful, danger-
ous, or disfiguring treatments to be employed.
2. Labeling Abortion as "Elective" Does Not Permit Restrictive
Prison Policy to Escape Eighth Amendment Review
The few cases that have addressed the issue, including Crawford, and
found that denial of access to abortion care did not violate the Eighth
Amendment often hinged their decisions on a finding that no "elective"
procedure can ever constitute a "serious medical need." The fact that non-
therapeutic abortions are labeled as "elective" does not mean that they do
not fall within the Eighth Amendment protections. The label itself is unwar-
ranted. The majority of treatments considered "elective," such as cosmetic
surgery, laser eye surgery, or hip or knee replacement are given that label
because "the procedure is beneficial to the patient but does not need to be
done at a particular time. 235 The decision to terminate a pregnancy however
"cannot be postponed, or it will be made by default with far-reaching con-
sequences. '236 Both the decision to terminate a pregnancy and the decision
to carry to term require timely care to avoid serious and permanent health
conditions. The Third Circuit agreed in Lanzaro:
[A] woman exercising her fundamental right to choose to terminate her
pregnancy requires medical care to effectuate that choice. Denial of the
required care will likely result in tangible harm to the inmate who wish-
es to terminate her pregnancy. Characterization of the treatment as ne-
cessary for the safe termination of an inmate's pregnancy as "elective" is
of little or no consequence in the context of the Estelle "serious medical
needs" formulation. An elective, nontherapeutic abortion may nonethe-
less constitute a "serious medical need" where denial or undue delay in
235. MedicineNet.com, Medical Dictionary Definitions of Popular Medical Terms,
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=14367 (last visited March 1, 2010).
236. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979).
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Prior to its holding in Crawford, the Eighth Circuit had relied on Lan-
zaro to reject the notion that "serious medical need" can be reduced to dis-
tinguishing between "elective" and "medically necessary" care. In Johnson
v. Bowers,238 the court cited Lanzaro to support the proposition that the
mere classification of a surgery as elective does not "abrogate the prison's
duty.. . to promptly provide necessary medical treatment for prisoners. 239
The court held that indefinitely delaying "elective" surgery to correct a left-
hand nerve injury was a denial of care for a "serious medical need" because
without the surgery the injury would constitute a "permanent handicap"
restricting day-to-day activities. 240 Thus, the Eighth Circuit has recognized
that when denial of treatment for a particular condition causes irreparable
harm, it is a "serious medical condition," regardless of whether prison offi-
cials characterize it as "elective." It would seem to follow that the life of an
inmate denied an abortion will be permanently altered-medically, physi-
cally, emotionally, and sociologically-by continued pregnancy and child-
birth, thus she has a "serious medical need" regardless of how the prison
chooses to label the procedure.
Yet this was not the result in Crawford. The Eighth Circuit claimed
that the Bowers decision was based on the prison gratuitously labeling a
clearly necessary medical procedure as "elective., 24' Therefore, the court
concluded that Bowers only stands for the proposition that gratuitous classi-
fication of "elective" treatment "will not automatically remove the prison's
responsibility to provide treatment, when that treatment is actually 'neces-
sary' for the health of the prisoner."2 42 The decision, the court reasoned, is
aimed at preventing prison officials from surreptitiously withholding medi-
cal treatment by labeling it as "elective,' 243 but this seems exactly what is
going on in cases of "elective" abortion. As discussed above, "elective"
abortion does not fit the typical classification of an "elective" procedure.
Unlike other "elective" procedures, a pregnant woman has no choice but to
make a decision between one of two treatment options. The other option,
carrying the child to term, is not called "elective pregnancy," so why should
the alternative treatment for the same condition be given such a label? The
237. Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 349 (3d
Cir. 1987).
238. 884 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1989).
239. Id. at 1056.
240. Id.
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fact that a woman, rather than her doctor, determines that an abortion is
necessary does not change the importance of that determination. Labeling
her choice as "elective" only works to trivialize the seriousness of her deci-
sion. Consequently, the conflict between Crawford and Bowers cannot be
resolved in spite of the court's attempt to do so.
3. A Prison Policy that Purposely Delays or Denies Access to
Abortion Shows "Deliberate Indifference" on the Part of Prison
Officials
Once the district court in Crawford determined that abortion care is a
"serious medical need" it became undisputable that the prison policy expli-
citly denying all access to the procedure constituted "deliberate indiffe-
rence" on the part of prison officials. The Eighth Circuit did not address this
prong. After finding abortion care was not a "serious medical need," it was
of no consequence whether officials were deliberately indifferent to it or
not. Clearly, in the case of Crawford, where prison policy created an inten-
tional denial of care, relief under the Eighth Amendment turned on the clas-
sification of the procedure rather than on the conduct of prison officials. The
issue of "deliberate indifference" becomes more significant when prison
policy serves only to create obstacles to receiving abortion care, or when
abortion policy is not openly acknowledged or expressed by officials.
The Supreme Court has defined "deliberate indifference" as "inten-
tionally denying or delaying access to medical care.,, 244 This definition
reaches beyond Crawford-type polices that completely deny abortion care to
include policies that create obstacles to obtaining the procedure. This was
the case in Lanzaro, where the Third Circuit found that "deliberate indiffe-
rence" could be established "where prison officials erect arbitrary and bur-
densome procedures that 'result[] in interminable delays and outright de-
nials of medical care to suffering inmates.,, 245 Under this analysis, the court
concluded that prison policy requiring inmates to receive a court-ordered
release to obtain an abortion was so burdensome as to cause serious delays
in obtaining the procedure.246 Officials made no attempt to minimize these
delays despite knowing that obtaining an abortion requires timely action in
order to obtain a safe and legal procedure.247
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with this assessment in Victoria W, finding
that a prison policy requiring a pregnant inmate to obtain a court order be-
244. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).






fore receiving an abortion did not constitute "deliberate indifference." 248
Arguably, a policy that requires a court order for an abortion, rather than for
a court ordered release which is much more difficult to obtain, is less bur-
densome and thereby may produce fewer delays. This less burdensome pol-
icy, however, still proved to be so burdensome to plaintiff Victoria that
access to an abortion was delayed to the point where she could no longer
legally receive one. Nevertheless, the court found that this policy did not
amount to "deliberate indifference" because she was given access to prenat-
al care after arriving in prison and attempts were made, although without
success, to arrange the procedure. 249 The court found that the problem was
not the policy, but with Victoria's lawyer, who did not effectively pursue
the court order on her behalf.
250
These distinctions are important for future prison abortion policy. All
courts seem to agree that if abortion was to be deemed a "serious medical
condition" then a policy that purposely delayed obtaining the procedure
until the point where it is no longer safe or legal would be considered "deli-
berate indifference." However, "a showing of simple or even heightened
negligence will not suffice" to prove culpability. 251' This leaves open the
possibility that politically motivated guards, officials, or medical practition-
ers could find ways to "accidentally" lose required documents, to "forget"
about requests, or to "mistakenly" give advice. The courts must guard
against this type of manipulative behavior; however, doing so will likely be
difficult, as it goes against the traditional deference that courts have granted
prison officials in determining how to run prisons. Furthermore, policies
that involve any type of judicial intervention allow prison officials to defer
the decision of the judge, rather than be the "but for" cause of the denial. In
jurisdictions that are predominantly anti-freedom of choice, the prisons can
craft policy to take advantage of this and delay or deter access to the courts.
Although the current obstacle to freedom of choice in prison is refusal to
classify the procedure as a "serious medical need," once abortion finally
achieves this classification these types of issues dealing with "deliberate
indifference" will need to be addressed. A more appropriate answer might
be to revisit the Eighth Amendment analysis and find that interference with
the right to choice is an Eighth Amendment violation without regard to se-
rious medical need.
248. Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475,485 (5th Cir. 2004).
249. Id. at 489-90.
250. Id. at 490. The court apparently had no practical experience in trying to litigate the
rights of an inmate through the bureaucracy of a prison system.
251. Id. at 489.
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4. Constitutional Analysis Should Be Based on General Eighth
Amendment Principles and Not on "Serious Medical Need"
Perhaps the true problem here is that this issue should not be analyzed
in the medical context at all. Under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the
state is not allowed to punish someone merely because of a condition which
exists and cannot punish someone in a way which is degrading to human
dignity. Because pregnancy is a condition which is irrelevant to any crime
the incarcerated woman has committed, it is degrading to her human dignity
to use that condition as a way of further penalizing her. Granted, this was
not a position raised in any of the cases discussed, including Roe v. Craw-
ford, but it is a position worth examining.
It is well established that a State may not punish a person for being
mentally ill, for being afflicted with a venereal disease, or for being ad-
dicted to narcotics. 2 Perhaps it is by this standard that a woman's right to
choose in prison should be enforced. Pregnancy is a condition for which the
woman's rights should not be altered merely because she is incarcerated,
and to do so would be cruel and unusual.
If Casey is currently the seminal case defining the right to choose, it
makes sense to look to Casey to determine how that right should be ana-
lyzed. Doing so leads to the conclusion that the basis of the right is not pre-
mised on serious medical need. Casey clearly holds: "These matters, involv-
ing the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment., 253 The Court further reasoned:
Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the State is entitled to
proscribe it in all instances. That is because the liberty of the woman is
at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the
law.... Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist,
without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however domi-
nant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture.
The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.2
54
Similarly, in his partial concurrence in Casey, Justice Stevens de-
scribed the right to choose: "Part of the constitutional liberty to choose is
the equal dignity to which each of us is entitled. A woman who decides to
252. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
253. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion).
254. Id. at 852.
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terminate her pregnancy is entitled to the same respect as a woman who
decides to carry the fetus to term. 255
Thus it is the condition of pregnancy, and not the conduct of abortion,
with which this analysis must be made. If the right to choose is so basic that
it implicates the fundamental right to liberty and human dignity, and if a
woman who chooses to terminate a pregnancy is entitled to the same defe-
rence as one who chooses to carry to term, then the question of whether
there is serious medical need or elective choice is not at issue. Cases that
analyze the issue as such hit wide of the mark. The test should be the same
as any other fundamental right analyzed in the Eighth Amendment context:
Does the limit placed by incarceration create an affront to human dignity?
In Robinson v. California,256 the Supreme Court struck down a statute
making it a criminal offense for a person to be addicted to drugs.257 The
Court reasoned, "in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law
which made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be univer-
sally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments., 258 Like the statute at issue
in Robinson, a policy that punishes a woman for the condition of pregnancy
is similarly cruel and unusual. In both instances the state would be punish-
ing a condition, not conduct. In Robinson, the punishment came in the form
of a ninety-day jail sentence for being the victim of a condition. In Craw-
ford and other prison abortion cases, punishment comes in the form of forc-
ing a choice, due to a condition, upon a woman who has a fundamental right
to make the choice on her own without interference from the state.
It is undisputed that in certain instances basic constitutional rights may
be curtailed or denied in prison without rising to the level of cruel and un-
usual punishment. As the Court pointed out in Robinson, though, "[e]ven
one day in prison would be cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of
having a common cold., 259 In other words, punishment that may not be con-
sidered harsh when matched with the appropriate offense becomes unduly
harsh when imposed for non-criminal behavior.
Punishment is also a violation of the Eighth Amendment when it in-
flicts unnecessary and wanton pain totally without penological justifica-
tion.260 In Hope v. Pelzer, handcuffing a prisoner to a hitching post as a pu-
nishment when he was already subdued was found to be degrading and an
affront to the prisoner's dignity in obvious violation of the Eighth Amend-
255. Id. at 920 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
256. 370 U.S. 660.
257. Id. at 667.
258. Id. at 666.
259. Id. at 667.
260. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002).
[Vol. 32
ABSENCE OF PENOLOGICAL RATIONALE
ment.26' Likewise, there is no legitimate penological reason to deny a preg-
nant inmate access to procedures to terminate a pregnancy; consequently
such denial must also be considered degrading and an affront to the prison-
er's dignity. As in Hope, safety concerns are at issue. In Hope, safety was
claimed as the reason for shackling the prisoner to a post, but the Court
found that any concern for safety had passed when the shackling occurred.
In the abortion context, safety concerns are no different for obtaining a ter-
mination of pregnancy than for treating a pregnancy carried to term, and in
many instances abortion may prove to be the safer option. Efforts to charac-
terize transportation to a provider facility as more dangerous are belied by
facts and history. Penological justifications simply do not exist. Therefore,
as in Hope, safety concerns cannot justify an affront to a prisoner's dignity
when such concerns are shown not to be legitimate.
In Farmer v. Brennan, 262 the Supreme Court defined a transsexual as
"one who has '[a] rare psychiatric disorder in which a person feels persis-
tently uncomfortable about his or her anatomical sex,' and who typically
seeks medical treatment, including hormonal therapy and surgery, to bring
about a permanent sex change."263 It went on to hold that the prison had
responsibility to house a transsexual who had not undergone a sex change
procedure in such a manner as to protect that person from violent assault
from other inmates. The Court found that allowing such assault serves no
penological interest, and held that "[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is
simply not 'part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society.' ,,264
While this case addresses liability of prison officials for injury sus-
tained at the hands of other prisoners, it is not wholly inapposite. The Court
held that denial of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities"
could result in an Eighth Amendment violation.265 The ability to choose to
terminate a pregnancy has been held to be a constitutional right of a preg-
nant woman. Denial of access to such a right must therefore be the unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain implicating the Eighth Amendment as a
denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. In this view,
the issue ceases to be one of serious medical need, and, like Farmer, is ana-
lyzed as a case of deliberate indifference to the general health and safety of
the inmate. In this case, a pregnant woman who wishes to terminate a preg-
nancy for her own health reasons, whether physical or mental, not because
of a proven medical need to do so-as required by Estelle.
261. Id. at 738.
262. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
263. Id. at 829.




The Farmer court reviews Estelle as a basis for defining "deliberate
indifference," not from the point of view of whether the medical care is
necessary or elective, but from the point of view of the conduct of the prison
official vis-A-vis the prisoner.266 The Court finally settled on the test for
defining "deliberate indifference":
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment
for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference.
267
In the abortion context, the prison official knows well the excessive
risks of pregnancy to inmate health and safety, and is aware from the fact of
pregnancy that substantial risk of serious harm exists. The NCCHC stan-
dards codify both knowledge and risk. Once a prison official also knows
that an inmate wishes to terminate her pregnancy, the additional psycholog-
ical and possible physical harm of denying that right is a fact of which the
official is actually aware. Again, the NCCHC standards are proof of this.
Absolute denial of access is therefore deliberate indifference to the health
and safety of the pregnant inmate. It is essentially allowing an assault on the
woman's body which she does not wish to experience. While the Farmer
test is one for determining prison official liability, it is useful in analyzing
what sort of Eighth Amendment analysis should apply and argues for an
analysis not confined to the serious medical need analysis, but one that more
fully examines the affront to human dignity caused by denial of access to
the ability to terminate a pregnancy, the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities.
As stated above, applying a Casey analysis, which would seek to de-
termine whether the prison policy constituted an undue burden on the wom-
an prisoner imposed by the state, would be even more appropriate. By ex-
amining Crawford and other prison abortion cases under Casey, courts
would avoid having to cram these types of cases into analysis established
for other unrelated issues, and instead allow them to be determined under
the framework set up by the Supreme Court specifically for the issue in dis-
pute. If Crawford had been so analyzed, the inescapable conclusion would
have been that the prison policy denying all transfers for "elective" abor-
tions was a complete bar, not just an undue burden, and the policy could not
have stood scrutiny.
266. Id. at 835.
267. Id. at 837.
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Whether using Robinson, Hope, Farmer, or Casey, any of these ana-
lyses seem to give the issue the deference it is properly due as a fundamen-
tal right of liberty in the line of cases of Griswold and Eisenstadt, as that
line was acknowledged in Casey.268 To subject the issue to a Turner analy-
sis, or even an Estelle analysis as a medical treatment, seems to relegate the
pregnant woman's choice to a level of broken bones rather than the intimate
and personal choice of a lifetime central to human dignity and personal au-
tonomy. The alternatives proposed here seem much more appropriate to the
right at issue.
V. CONCLUSION
As the number of women entering United States prisons continues to
grow, so will the problem of what to do when a pregnant inmate requests
abortion care. The current variations in both prison policies and court opi-
nions fail to adequately safeguard the right of women in prison to exercise
their constitutionally protected right to choose. Decisions to strike down
policy that interferes with this right, such as the decision made by the
Eighth Circuit in Roe v. Crawford, represent only small victories. As long as
courts continue to scrutinize prison abortion policy under a rational basis
test, and as long as courts continue to deny that abortion is a serious medical
need, politically motivated prison officials will continue to interfere with the
right to choose for non-penological reasons.
Treating the right to choose differently depending on whether the
woman wishing to exercise it is currently incarcerated cannot be defended
from a penological perspective. Whether behind bars or out in society, the
woman is pregnant and in both instances a choice needs to be made to ad-
dress the condition of pregnancy, whether the choice is termination of the
pregnancy or carrying the fetus to term. Both alternatives are available to
women outside of prison; one cannot justify denying the option to incarce-
rated women. Doing so allows the state to interfere with a woman's preg-
nancy at a point when even the father of the child would not be able to do
so. When looked at realistically, brushing aside all of the rationalization and
pretext, policies such as the ones at issue in Crawford, Lanzaro, and Victo-
ria W. cannot rationally be explained as anything other than a reflection of
the anti-choice views of the prison officials involved. The continued defe-
rence of the courts to prison officials allows this imposed political morality
to persist, yet it is the antithesis of the role the courts are designed to play in
our society under our system of government.




The freedom to choose is a fundamental right that is protected by our
Constitution. Whether or not everyone agrees with this, it is the law as it
currently stands. Prisons should not be allowed to make an end run around
the protections afforded to this right at the expense of one of the country's
most vulnerable populations simply because members of that population are
prisoners. Perhaps one day nationwide standards will be developed that can
guarantee access to abortion care, both in prison and outside of prison, but
until then courts can do much to alleviate the problems. By rejecting the
Turner rationality test, and applying the Casey undue burden standard,
courts will better be able to balance the rights of inmates against the legiti-
mate concerns of prison officials. The reality is that most prison regulations
that seek to rationalize some restriction on obtaining an abortion in reality
erect an absolute barrier to obtaining an abortion. Regardless of how offi-
cials justify this barrier, it creates an undue burden on the right to choose
and violates the current constitutional jurisprudence concerning that right.
These regulations should be seen for the political interference that they are
and should be analyzed in such a way that recognizes the fundamental na-
ture of the right to choose. Call it "undue burden" rather than "strict scruti-
ny" if you must, but apply the standard and do so consistently. This standard
will eliminate the deference that allows prisons to create pretextual rules,
while at the same time be flexible enough to permit rules that legitimately
ensure the safety and security of prison officials and inmates. A separate, or
Turner, analysis is not required.
Courts must also acknowledge that abortion, as a treatment option for
pregnancy, constitutes a "serious medical need" within the context of the
Eighth Amendment, or rather courts should impose an analysis that does not
address the right from a medical perspective, but purely from one of basic
human dignity. If our society is going to indulge in the incarceration hyste-
ria, which makes more and more victimless conduct illegal, prison popula-
tions will only continue to spiral out of control. If Eighth Amendment re-
straints placed upon the now often private agencies with which governments
contract to run these penal institutions are relaxed, we will be not only
creating a system which routinely ignores and violates constitutional prin-
ciples, but we will be abandoning any pretext of the rehabilitative goal of
incarceration. Denying women a constitutional right to terminate a pregnan-
cy when such a choice does not seriously impact the institutional security in
any way, does not increase institutional costs, and does not further any gov-
ernment acknowledged goal of incarceration. Denial of that right should be
considered cruel and unusual, regardless of how the medical procedure is
labeled.
Even if considered only in a medical context, considering a termination
of a pregnancy as a serious medical need will not only prevent the gratuit-
ous label of "elective" from impeding access to the procedure, but will also
acknowledge the significance that the availability of such a decision has to
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women as individuals, help restore an individual inmate's dignity, and pre-
vent giving her yet another reason to withdraw from society as a result of
the way she is treated by society. If we are true to the articulated societal
goals of incarceration and to the ideals stated in the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, this will produce a better and more positive result in the long
run, and remain consistent with constitutional law.

